

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02775 01 OF 03 282023Z

73

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
----- 128683

R 281529Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2215

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 2775

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESENTATION BY US REP
ON STABILIZING MEASURES AS GIVEN IN PLENARY SESSION
IN VIENNA ON MARCH 28, 1974.

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
AS THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF PLENARY SESSIONS
APPROACHES, IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN TYING TOGETHER
SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN SAID HERE. FOUR
RECENT WESTERN PRESENTATIONS HAVE DEALT WITH THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02775 01 OF 03 282023Z

SUBJECT OF MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS.

THREE OF THESE HAVE DEALT WITH ONE IMPORTANT CATEGORY OF SUCH MEASURES: NAMELY, STABILIZING MEASURES. I SHOULD LIKE TODAY TO SUMMARIZE WHAT MY GERMAN, CANADIAN AND BELGIAN COLLEAGUES HAVE SAID ON THIS SUBJECT, AND TO RECAPITULATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

THE STABILIZING MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS PROCESS. THE REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THEM. BOTH THE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND THE STABILIZING MEASURES RELATED TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THESE FORCES WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED WORK TOWARDS THE SAME OBJECTIVE. THAT IS, THEY BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THESE ARE THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES MAKE TO THESE OBJECTIVES WILL NEED TO BE REINFORCED AND SUPPLEMENTED BY STABILIZING MEASURES. THIS IS SO BECAUSE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WILL MAKE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO DIMINISH AMBIGUITIES CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF REMAINING FORCES. FURTHERMORE, STABILIZING MEASURES WILL RESOLVE CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF SUCH REDUCTIONS.

THESE ARE THE TWO BASIC REASONS WHY WE BELIEVE THESE MEASURES ARE NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT. THEY EXPLAIN WHY WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT DISCUSS REDUCTIONS WITHOUT ALSO DISCUSSING STABILIZING MEASURES. AND THEY EXPLAIN WHY THERE IS SUBSTANTIVE MERIT IN THESE MEASURES WHICH PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ADDRESS.

SINCE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DEALS ONLY WITH US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, THE STABILIZING MEASURES BEING PROPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROPOSAL ARE ALSO SO LIMITED, SINCE IN OUR VIEW STABILIZING MEASURES ARE A LOGICAL CONCOMITANT OF SUCH REDUCTIONS. THE FORCES OF THE US AND USSR, IN ADDITION TO BEING THOSE SUGGESTED FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02775 01 OF 03 282023Z

PHASE I REDUCTIONS, ARE ALSO THOSE OF THE LARGEST COUNTRIES ON EACH SIDE, SO THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR FORCES ARE THEREFORE OF PRIORITY INTEREST.

I SHOULD LIKE THEREFORE TO EXPAND ON THESE GENERAL POINTS AND EXPLAIN WHY WE BELIEVE THESE MEASURES ARE IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES.

A FIRST-PHASE OUTCOME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION. THE TWO SIDES WOULD HAVE ENTERED INTO A NEW, AND UNPRECEDENTED, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER. AND THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WILL BE OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES THAN AT PRESENT.

SPECIFICALLY, AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD NATURALLY ENTAIL ESTABLISHING CEILINGS ON THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE, THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY LIMIT THEIR PRESENT FREEDOM TO BRING ADDITIONAL FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANS THAT THE FREEDOM OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA TO RESPOND TO AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS WOULD BE CONTRACTUALLY LIMITED. THUS, IT BECOMES ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SITUATIONS MIGHT ARISE WHICH APPEARED TO THE OTHER SIDE TO BE AMBIGUOUS.

ONCE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A LIMITATION OF FREEDOM TO BRING ADDITIONAL FORCES INTO THE AREA, HAS BEEN REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REMAINING US AND SOVIET FORCES WILL FOR THESE REASONS BE OF GREATER CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES. NOT MERELY THE LEVELS OF THESE FORCES, BUT ALSO THEIR ACTIVITIES, WILL DETERMINE WHETHER, FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS, MUTUAL CONFIDENCE GROWS OR DIMINISHES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, FOLLOWING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02775 01 OF 03 282023Z

A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD CAUSE CONCERN.

WITH FEWER FORCES IN THE AREA, AND A RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT
E E E E E E E

ADP000
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02775 02 OF 03 281720Z

73
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 125973

R 281529Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2216

SEDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 2775

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

AMBIQUITIES IN THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES REMAINING AFTER
REDUCTIONS ARE TAKEN MIGHT CREATE CONCERN, MISUNDERSTANDING
AND INSTABILITY.

WITH THESE BASIC POINTS IN MIND, I SHALL NOW RECAPITULATE
THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING BY READING OUT
THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR STABILIZING MEASURES
IN PLENARY STATEMENTS BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR STABILIZING MEASURES MADE IN
PLENARY STATEMENTS BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES

AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02775 02 OF 03 281720Z

THE FIRST PHASE WOULD NATURALLY ENTAIL ESTABLISHING
CEILINGS ON THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REMAINING
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THUS, AGREEMENT TO RESPECT
THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED
THROUGH AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WOULD BE NEEDED.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT
TO EXCEED THE FORCE LEVELS IN THE AREA WHICH WOULD
RESULT WHEN AGREED REDUCTIONS ARE DEDUCTED FROM CURRENT
FORCE LEVELS.

THIS, IN TURN, WOULD REQUIRE LIMITATONS ON THE
ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA.

BUT TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED OF BOTH THE US AND THE USSR TO REPLACE, ROTATE AND EXERCISE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA, THERE WOULD BE SPECIFICALLY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE LEVELS.

ONCE THIS IS AGREED, THE PARTIES WILL WISH TO HAVE A LOW OF INFORMATION TO HELP ASSURE THEM THAT THE NEW US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS, AS WELL AS THE AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO THEM, ARE BEING RESPECTED.

I. NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS

THE US AND USSR WOULD SUBMIT THREE TYPES OF REPORTS:

(A) AN ANNUAL SCHEDULE SETTING FORTH ANTICIPATED MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE COMING YEAR. IN THIS SCHEDULE THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS ENTERING OR LEAVING FOR EACH CALENDAR MONTH WOULD BE LISTED. THE SCHEDULE WOULD ALSO LIST SEPARATELY THE ANTICIPATED ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF ALL GROUND FORCE UNITS OF MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONNEL, AND ALSO ANY ENTRIES BY 5,000 OR MORE INDIVIDUAL GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WITHIN A 24-HOUR PERIOD. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED IN EACH SUCH MOVEMENT, THEIR UNIT DESCRIPTIONS, THEIR DATES AND POINTS OF ENTRY, THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT TO BE USED, AND A DESCRIPTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02775 02 OF 03 281720Z

THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS.

(B) A REPORT 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF EACH CALENDAR MONTH WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE ANY CHANGES OR ADDITIONS TO THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED FOR THAT MONTH IN THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE.

(C) THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE END OF EACH CALENDAR MONTH, A REPORT ON THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TOTAL GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WHO ENTERED OR LEFT THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS DURING THAT MONTH.

II. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

(A) A MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISE WOULD BE DEFINED AS THE DEPLOYMENT INTO OR WITHIN THE AREA:

-- OF A US OR SOVIET DIVISION FORCE, OR OF
MORE THAN 10,000 US OR SOVIET GROUND FORCE

PERSONNEL IN UNITS

--MORE THAN 25 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE THEIR
MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE AREA AND OUTSIDE
NORMAL TRAINING AREAS TO BE DEFINED

-- FOR MORE THAN 24 HOURS.

(B) THE US AND USSR WOULD EACH SUBMIT AN ANNUAL
SCHEDULE OF SUCH MAJOR GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, INCLUDING
THE NAME, GENERAL PURPOSE, AND APPROXIMATE PERIOD AND
SCALE OF EACH EXERCISE.

(C) THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE OF EXERCISES WOULD BE
SUPPLEMENTED AND POSSIBLY REVISED BY A DETAILED REPORT
60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF EACH EXERCISE. ADDITIONAL EXER-
CISES DECIDED ON AFTER SUBMISSION OF THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE
WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 60-DAY REPORT. IN ADDITION,
SOME FURTHER FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING LAST-MINUTE CHANGES
IN EXERCISES WOULD BE PERMITTED.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02775 02 OF 03 281720Z

III. LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER, AND DURATION
OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND
FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

(A) US AND SOVIET MAJOR EXERCISES, AS DEFINED ABOVE,
COULD NOT EXCEED 50,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE
AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT ANY ONE TIME.

(B) THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN A
MULTINANTIONAL EXERCISE IN WHICH US AND SOVIET PARTICIPATION
MET THE CRITERIA FOR A MAJOR EXERCISE AS DEFINED ABOVE,
AND THE TOTAL GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE
ENTIRE EXERCISE EXCEEDED 50,000 IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS
AT ANY ONE TIME.

(C) THE US AND USSR WOULD CONDUCT NO MORE THAN ONE
MAJOR EXERCISE, AS DEFINED ABOVE, AT A TIME.

(D) THE US AND USSR WOULD CONDUCT NO MORE THAN 6
MAJOR EXERCISES, AS DEFINED ABOVE, IN ANY CALENDAR YEAR.

(E) THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MAJOR
EXERCISES, AS DEFINED ABOVE, LASTING LONGER THAN 60 DAYS.

(F) THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT SCHEDULE TWO MAJOR
EXERCISES, AS DEFINED ABOVE, WITH LESS THAN A 30-DAY
INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST ONE AND
BEGINNNING OF THE SECOND ONE.

(G) THE US AND USSR WOULD LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THEIR GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN NORMAL GROUND TRAINING AREAS, INCLUDING THOSE ENROUTE TO AND FROM THEM, TO 50,000 AT ANY ONE TIME. THESE GROUND TRAINING AREAS WOULD BE THOSE NOW DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING AND WOULD BE LISTED AND DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT.

IV. EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

(A) THE US AND USSR WOULD INVITE OBSERVERS TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 VIENNA 02775 02 OF 03 281720Z

GROUND PHASES OF ALL MAJOR EXERCISES, AS DEFINED ABOVE.

(B) A PARTY THUS INVITED WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SEND UP TO THREE OBSERVERS TOGETHER WITH UP TO SIX SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO EACH EXERCISE.

(C) THE INVITING COUNTRY WOULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE TO HANDLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH OBSERVERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02775 03 OF 03 281857Z

73

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
----- 127324

R 281529Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2217

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 2775

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

MR. CHAIRMAN, I SHALL NOW REVIEW BRIEFLY THE
SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES OF EACH OF THE PROPOSED MEASURES.
THE FIRST MEASURE CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
MOVEMENTS INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA. SUCH A MEASURE
WOULD HELP TO RESOLVE A PRACTICAL PROBLEM ARISING FROM
REDUCTIONS. FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS, US AND SOVIET FORCE
LEVELS WILL HAVE TO BE RESPECTED. HOWEVER, EXCEPTIONS
WILL BE REQUIRED FOR REPLACEMENTS, ROTATIONS, AND
EXERCISES, AND THESE EXCEPTIONS MUST THEMSELVES BE
LIMITED. NOTIFICATION OF THE MOVEMENTS OF GROUND FORCES
INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA WILL FACILITATE THE TASK OF
PROVIDING MUTUAL ASSURANCE THAT THE NEW US AND SOVIET
FORCE LEVELS, AS WELL AS THE AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO THEM,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02775 03 OF 03 281857Z

ARE BEING RESPECTED.

MOREOVER, THE MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND
FORCES INTO THE AREA COULD, IF MISINTERPRETED, BECOME A
MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF SUCH MOVEMENTS IS THEREFORE REQUIRED
IF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS ARE TO HAVE THE EFFECT OF
BUILDING CONFIDENCE RATHER THAN GENERATING MISUNDERSTANDING.

THE SECOND MEASURE WE HAVE PROPOSED CALLS FOR PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES. OUR PROPOSED
DEFINITION OF A MAJOR EXERCISE IS DESIGNED TO COVER ONLY
THOSE EXERCISES WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY GIVE RISE TO AM-
BIGUITIES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS, WHILE PRESERVING ADEQUATE
MILITARY FLEXIBILITY. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SUCH MAJOR
EXERCISES WILL HELP TO AVOID MISINTERPRETATION OF THEIR
PURPOSE.

FOR SIMILAR REASONS, WE PROPOSED IN THE THIRD MEASURE
CERTAIN QUANTITATIVE LIMITS ON MAJOR EXERCISES. THE
PURPOSE OF THESE LIMITS IS TO ASSURE EACH SIDE THAT
EXERCISES WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE THREATENING OR DE-

STABILIZING IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE LIMITED THEIR FREEDOM TO RESPOND TO SUCH AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THESE LIMITS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO PERMIT AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF MILITARY TRAINING.

THUS, WE BELIEVE THE PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ARE BOTH MODEST AND REASONABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE FACT THAT OUR PROPOSED DEFINITION OF A MAJOR EXERCISE EXCLUDES THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND FORCES CONDUCTED WITHIN NORMAL TRAINING AREAS. THESE AREAS WOULD, AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED, BE THOSE NOW DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING ON EACH SIDE, AND THEY WOULD BE LISTED AND DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, OUR PROPOSED DEFINITION OF A MAJOR EXERCISE ALSO EXCLUDES ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY GROUND FORCES WITHIN A 25 KILOMETER RADIUS OF THEIR MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE AREA. AND IT EXCLUDES EXERCISES LASTING LESS THAN 24 HOURS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02775 03 OF 03 281857Z

ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN NORMAL GROUND TRAINING AREAS WOULD BE SUBJECT SIMPLY TO THE 50,000-MAN LIMITATION WE HAVE SUGGESTED. THAT IS, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF US OR SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN NORMAL GROUND TRAINING AREAS, INCLUDING PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO OR FROM THESE TRAINING AREAS, WOULD BE LIMITED TO 50,000MEN. THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTION ON GROUND FORCES TRAINING WITHIN 25 KILOMETERS OF THEIR OWN PERMANENT MILITARY GARRISONS.

THE FOURTH MEASURE WE HAVE PROPOSED CALLS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES. THIS, TOO, WOULD HELP TO REDUCE AMBIGUITIES OCCASIONED BY MAJOR EXERCISES AND WOULD DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES THAT THE EXERCISES CONCERNED WERE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE AGREED LIMITATIONS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PROPOSALS ARE ALL DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE RISK THAT MILITARY TRAINING MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED. AS SUCH, THEY WOULD HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF REDUCED FORCES WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE CONCERN OR INSTABILITY. THE MEASURES WOULD ALSO HELP TO CLARIFY THE PURPOSE OF CERTAIN MAJOR FORCE MOVEMENTS. THIS WOULD FACILITATE ASSURANCE THAT AGREEMENTS ON FORCE LEVELS WERE BEING RESPECTED. FINALLY, THE MEASURES WOULD DIMINISH THE RISK OF A SURPRISE ATTACK, THEREBY FURTHER ENHANCING MUTUAL

CONFIDENCE.

WHILE, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, WE MAY WISH TO PROPOSE FURTHER MEASURES, THE PACKAGE OF STABILIZING MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD SERVE TO REINFORCE AND SUPPLEMENT THE CONTRIBUTION REDUCTIONS COULD MAKE TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO KEEP THOSE WE HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED RAHTER MODEST INSCOPE, AND HAVE GIVEN THEM CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY.

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR PROPOSED STABILIZING MEASURES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02775 03 OF 03 281857Z

WILL SERVE TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS AGREED UPON HERE IN FACT CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS MEETING THE COMMON OBJECTIVES. THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS IN THAT THEY MEET THE NEW CONDITIONS WHICH OUR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WILL CREATE.

WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THIS CONDITION AND OUR OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCED STABILITY IN EUROPE CAN BEST BE MET BY THE ADOPTION OF STABILIZING MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE WHICH I HA
E E E E E E E

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA02775
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740068-0384
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974036/aaaaafjg.tel
Line Count: 518
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: PARM, US, GE, CA, BE, UR, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005